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Leahy: Constitutional Law

Constitutional Law
by James E. Leahy*
Restrictions on the political activities of public employees
and the application of the statutory ban on obscenity were
some of the First Amendment problems presented to the California appellate courts this past year.
Due process also received some attention. The courts
were faced with such diverse questions as the regulation of
insurance companies doing business in California exclusively
by mail, the right to a hearing when the government takes
action against an individual, and the taxation of foreign-based
aircraft that fly into, out of, and within California.
Reapportionment of an irrigation district, license taxes, and
payment for care of a patient at a state mental institution were
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among the problems in the realm of equal protection that
confronted the courts.
Bagley and Its Aftermath
FIRST AMENDMENT-Political Rights of Public Employees Upheld

Twice during the past year, the California Supreme Court
reexamined the validity of restrictions on political activities
of public employees. The first occasion was Bagley v. Washington Township Hospital District,l which involved the discharge of a nurse's aide for participating in a movement to
recall certain directors of the hospital district by which she
was employed. She had been hired by the hospital district
as a nurse's aide in April, 1960. The record showed that she
consistently performed her assigned duties to the complete
satisfaction of her superiors. Late in 1963 a number of citizens had become dissatisfied with the policies of the hospital
district and commenced a recall campaign against certain of
its directors. During her off-duty hours, the nurse's aide participated in the activities of this group. In February, 1964,
the hospital administrator issued to all hospital personnel a
memo entitled "Political Activities of Public Employees,"
which stated that participation in political activity by employees, for or against any candidate or ballot measure pertaining
to the district, was unlawful and constituted grounds for dismissal. The nurse's aide was called into the hospital administrator's office and asked if she had discontinued her activity
in the recall movement. When she replied negatively, her
employment was terminated. She thereupon brought suit
against the hospital, seeking reinstatement, back wages, and
damages.
The second occasion, Rosenfield v. Malcolm,2 involved a
doctor employed as an assistant district health officer. While
employed by the county, and before attaining civil service
status, the doctor became associated with an organization
calling itself the Ad Hoc Committee to End Discrimination.
1. 65 Cal.2d 499, 55 Cal. Rptr. 401,
421 P.2d 409 (1966).
338
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2. 65 Cal.2d 559, 55 Cal. Rptr. 505,
421 P.2d 697 (1967).
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The county advised him that his continued membership in
this organization was incompatible with his employment as
a health officer. He indicated his willingness to cease active
participation in the committee, but he refused to completely
sever his connection with the organization, and was thereupon
discharged.
In both these cases the court held that dismissal violated
the constitutional rights of the employees as guaranteed by
the First Amendment. The court set forth the basis for both
decisions by stating its holding in Bagley:
[W]e hold that a governmental agency which would
require a waiver of constitutional rights as a condition
of public employment must demonstrate: (1) that the
political restraints rationally relate to the enhancement
of the public service, (2) that the benefits which the
public gains by the restraints outweigh the resulting impairment of constitutional rights, and (3) that no alternatives less subversive of constitutional rights are available. s
While the Bagley decision is not one of first impression in
California, it is the first time the court has so clearly spelled
out the standards by which governmental action will hereafter
be measured.
Pointing toward the result in these two cases was Fort v.
Civil Service Commission,4 which concerned the application
of a section of the charter of Alameda County. This section
prohibited any
person holding a position in the classified civil service
[from taking] part in political management or
affairs in any political campaign
or in any
campaign to adopt or reject any initiative or referendum
5
measure.
3. 65 Cal.2d at 501-502, 55 Cal.
Rptr. at 403, 421 P.2d at 411.
4. 61 Cal.2d 331, 38 Cal. Rptr. 625,
392 P.2d 385 (1964).

5. 61 Cal.2d at 333, 38 Cal. Rptr.
at 626, 392 P.2d at 386.
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The plaintiff, an employee of Alameda County, had become
associated with a political campaign and was dismissed for
that reason. Although recognizing that one employed in
public service does not have a constitutional right to such employment, the Calfornia Supreme Court pointed out that a
"person cannot properly be barred or removed from public
employment arbitrarily or in disregard of his constitutional
rights.,,6 The court made a a thorough analysis of pertinent
California and United States Supreme Court decisions and
concluded:
The principles set forth in the recent decisions do not
admit of wholesale restrictions on political activities
merely because the persons affected are public employees, particularly when it is considered that there are
millions of such persons. It must appear that restrictions imposed by a governmental entity are not broader
than are required to preserve the efficiency and integrity
of its public service. 7 (Emphasis added.)
No standards were expressly set forth in Fort except the
standard emphasized above. However, the court implied that
there must be some showing of a compelling public need
to sustain provisions as broad as the one in question. No
such compelling need had been shown.
The Bagley opinion uses Fort as a starting point. The
court goes on to point out that a government may legitimately
withhold benefits from its citizens. But this does not mean
that when benefits are granted they can be granted on an
arbitrary deprivation of constitutional rights. Once it is recognized that public employment does not deprive the employee
of constitutional protection, one has a starting point from
which restrictions on his rights can be scrutinized. Although
it might be argued that because certain rights are stated in
absolute terms in the Bill of Rights, they are absolute,S it is
clear that they are not always so treated. Even the cherished

http://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/callaw/vol1967/iss1/15

6. 61 Cal.2d at 334, 38 Cal. Rptr. at
627, 392 P.2d at 387.
7. 61 Cal.2d at 337-338, 38 Cal.
Rptr. at 629, 392 P.2d at 389.
340
CAL LA W 1967

8. See dissenting opinion of Justice
Black in Konigsberg v. State Bar of
Cal., 366 U.S. at 56, 6 L.Ed.2d at 120,
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rights guaranteed by the First Amendment have been subjected to restriction when there was an overriding, compelling
public need. 9
The adoption by the United States Supreme Court of the
position that constitutional rights are not absolute presents
state courts with the problem of devising some standard by
which governmental restriction on those rights can be measured. The standard adopted in Bagley appears to be a workable formula. Any such standard should weigh heavily in
favor of the individual, and his rights should be considered
absolute insofar as it is possible to do so. Although Justice
Black might argue that this is still a balancing, which is
forbidden by the Constitution, the standard adopted by the
California Supreme Court will give considerable protection
to the public employee in the exercise of his rights.
The standard places the burden squarely on the government to sustain its action, and this is where the burden clearly
ought to be, for the rights protected by the Bill of Rights are
guaranteed to the individual. The starting point for all
discussion of these rights is that they exist, they belong to
the individual, and they are protected by the Constitution.
When the government contends that it must infringe upon
these rights to protect its interests, the government ought to
have the burden of proving the necessity for such infringement. What must the government show in order to discharge
this burden under the Bagley standard? The government first
must show "that the political restraints rationally relate to
."10
Any rethe enhancement of the public service.
straint that is not rationally related to the benefit to be gained
by the government would, of course, be arbitrary and violate
the fundamental due process standard that has been the basis
of many United States Supreme Court decisions. l l
Next it must show "that the benefits which the public
gains by the restraints outweigh the resulting impairment of
9. See e.g., Konigsberg v. State Bar
of Cal., 366 U.S. 36, 6 L.Ed.2d 105,
81 S.Ct. 997 (1961); Reynolds v. United
States, 98 U.S. (8 Otto) 145, 25 L.Ed.
244 (1878).

10. 65 Cal.2d at 501, 55 Cal. Rptr.
at 403, 421 P.2d at 411 (1966).
11. See Wieman v. Updegraff, 344
U.S. 183, 97 L.Ed. 216, 73 S.Ct. 215
(1952).
CAL LAW 1967
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constitutional rights.
"12 If weighing we must do,
then certainly in order to tip the scales in favor of the government the benefits to the public must outweigh the detriment
to the individual. While the standard adopted does not indicate precisely to what extent the public gain must outweigh
the individual's detriment, the opinion uses such language as
"manifestly outweighs"13 and "compelling public interest.,,14
Finally, the government must show that "no alternatives
less subversive of constitutional rights are available."15 That
this criterion should be part of any standard that attempts
to define the limits on government action against its employees follows again from the adoption of the basic premise
that public employment does not deprive the employee of
his constitutional rights. By starting from this point, it is
incumbent on the government to devise means of reaching
the result it desires by searching out and evaluating all available alternatives before adopting any regulations that infringe
on the employee's rights. Once it adopts a restriction, the
government should bear the responsibility of showing that
there are no less restrictive alternatives that would accomplish
the desired result.
The standard enunciated in the Bagley case, and affirmed
in Rosenfield, speaks of "political restraints," since these two
cases involve the exercise of an individual's right to engage
in political activity. It would appear, however, that the court
was concerned not only with government restriction on political activities as involved in Bagley and Rosenfield, but also
with government infringement on other constitutional rights.
Several cases illustrating this conclusion will be discussed.
FIRST AMENDMENT-"Filthy Speech" Banned on Campus

That the Bagley test will apply in other areas is borne out
by its application in Goldberg v. Regents of University of

http://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/callaw/vol1967/iss1/15

12. 65 Cal.2d at 501-502, 55 Cal.
Rptr. at 403, 421 P.2d at 411 (1966).

14. 65 Cal.2d at 507, 55 Cal. Rptr.
at 408, 421 P.2d at 415.

13. 65 Cal.2d at 506, 55 Cal. Rptr.
at 407, 421 P.2d at 415.

15. 65 Cal.2d at 502, 55 Cal. Rptr.
at 403, 421 P.2d at 411.
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California. 1s Several students had been suspended and dismissed for participating in the so-called filthy speech rallies
on the Berkeley campus of the University of California. Protesting the arrest of a nonstudent who had displayed a sign
on the campus containing a "filthy" word, the students involved had used the same "filthy" word, as well as other language generally not acceptable as conversation in polite
society. After disciplinary action had been taken against the
students following a hearing before a special ad hoc committee
at the university, the students sought a writ of mandate to
compel their reinstatement to the university. They contended
that the action of the university was an unconstitutional limitation on their First Amendment rights, that the regulation
was unconstitutionally vague, and that they had been denied
procedural process. The superior court entered a judgment
dismissing the petition. Upon appeal to the Court of Appeal
for the First District, the decision was affirmed.
The significance of the decision lies in Justice Taylor's
approach to the problem. He pointed out that whether attendance at publicly financed institutions of higher education is a
right or privilege is of no import. What is important is the
determination that attendance at such an institution is of great
value to the individual, and should be regarded as a benefit
somewhat analogous to that of public employment. A Bagleytype standard is therefore the appropriate standard for the
analysis of students' rights. Goldberg does not state the test
as clearly as does the Bagley case, and although Justice Taylor
does a good job of deciding the Goldberg case within the
framework of the test he enunciates, it would appear that
the Bagley test is more specific and would require the court
to make a more searching inquiry into the relative merits of
the restrictions on the individual's rights. 17
16. 248 Cal.App.2d 867, 57 Cal.
Rptr. 463 (1967).
17. Mention should also be made of
Belshaw v. City of Berkeley, 246 Cal.
App.2d 493, 54 Cal. Rptr. 727 (1966).
In this case, the appellate court upheld
a lower court writ of mandamus that
vacated a 30-day suspension of a fire-

Published by GGU Law Digital Commons, 1967

man from a city fire department. The
city, acting under its personnel rules and
regulations, suspended the fireman for
writing a letter to the local newspaper
concerning salary differences between
firemen and policemen. The court held
that the comments made by the plaintiff represented nothing more than an
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FOURTH AMENDMENT-Receipt of Welfare Benefits
Cannot Be Conditioned on Waiver of Rights

The California Supreme Court applied the Bagley test in
Parrish v. Civil Service Commission 18 to determine whether
the receipt of welfare benefits may be conditioned on a waiver
of rights embodied in the Fourth Amendment. In November,
1962, the Board of Supervisors of Alameda County ordered
the county welfare director to initiate a series of unannounced
early morning searches of the homes of welfare recipients
for the purpose of detecting the presence of unauthorized
males. Because they lacked experience in this type of investigation, the social workers involved received special instructions. They were to work in pairs, one member surveying
the back door while the recipient's own social worker presented himself at the front door and sought admittance. Once
inside, he would proceed to the rear door and admit his companion. Together the two would conduct a thorough search
of the entire dwelling, giving particular attention to beds,
closets, bathrooms, and other possible places of concealment.
No search warrants were obtained, nor were any probable
cause criteria used to establish which homes were to be
searched. The majority of homes searched were under no
suspicion whatever. Parrish was one of the social workers
chosen to participate in the first wave of raids. He submitted
a letter to his superiors declaring that he would not participate
because of his conviction that such searches were illegal. He
was thereafter discharged for insubordination.
The court decided that the Bagley test was the appropriate
one, for it applies whenever "the conditions annexed to the
enjoyment of a public-conferred benefit require a waiver of
rights secured by the Constitution. . . ."19 The court then
found that these searches did not meet the third part of the
exercise of his constitutionally protected
right of free speech, for which, in the
absence of a showing that his conduct
impaired the public service, he could
not properly be punished. (246 Cal.
App.2d at 498.) The court did not have
the benefit of the Bagley case on
344
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which to base its decision, but did take
its cue from the Fort case.
18. 66 Ca1.2d 260, 57 Cal. Rptr. 623,
425 P.2d 223 (1967).
19. 66 Cal.2d at 271, 57 Cal. Rptr. at
630, 425 P.2d at 230.
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Bagley test because the county chose not only to search homes
where fraud was suspected, but also homes where fraud was
not suspected. The court concluded that any benefit to the
county by indiscriminate searches was speculative at best and
must yield to the right of innocent persons to be secure in
their homes. Alternative methods were available to the
county to search out fraud in the welfare program. Having
applied the Bagley test to determine that the unannounced
searches of the unsuspicious homes of welfare recipients were
invalid, the court next held that the county could not discharge a welfare worker for refusal to participate in these
searches where the reason for his refusal was that he thought
that they were illegal.
FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT-Due Process: To Wear
a Beard Is Liberty

The Court of Appeal for the Second District also applied
the Bagley test to uphold the nonpolitical right of a high
school teacher to wear a beard. In Finot v. Pasadena City
Board of Education ,20 a teacher was transferred to home
teaching because, contrary to administrative policy, he insisted on wearing a beard. Believing that there was correlation between a student's appearance and his behavior, school
authorities contended that if a teacher were to wear a beard,
the male students would be encouraged to imitate him. With
a writ of mandamus, the teacher tried to force the school
authorities to reassign him to classroom teaching. The writ
was denied in the superior court, but the Court of Appeal
reversed, holding that the teacher was denied due process of
law. It found that wearing a beard was not a privilege,
that it was not within the purview of the Fourth Amendment
guarantee to be secure in one's person, and that the ban on
beards was not a denial of equal protection. The due process
clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, however, was found
to give a teacher the right to wear a beard. It was "one of
20. 250 Ca1. App.2d 189, 58 Ca1.
Rptr. 520 (1967).
CAL LAW 1967
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[those] constitutionally unnamed but constitutionally protected personal liberties."l
After determining that a constitutional right was involved,
the next problem was to determine to what extent the government (school authorities) could infringe on it as a condition
for teaching in the public schools. For an answer to this
question the court turned to Bagley and the three-part standard enunciated there. As to the first part, the court pointed
out that "as a matter of actual experience,"2 there was no
showing that wearing the beard disrupted or impaired classroom discipline; it was merely the opinion of the principal
that the beard would render the rule against student beards
more difficult to enforce. The court, however, agreed that
this was a rational basis for the rule; therefore, part one of
the test was satisfied. However, the benefit to the public
did not outweigh the impairment of the individual rights, and
reasonable alternatives were available. The restriction on
teachers wearing beards, therefore, violated due process. 3
FIRST AMENDMENT-Obscenity: What Is It?
This First Amendment problem arose in Landau v. Fording. 4
The trial court found "Un Chant d'Amour," a film written
and directed by Jean Genet, depicting acts of sexual perversion in a prison, to be obscene within the meaning of Penal
Code section 311 (a).5 The Court of Appeal affirmed a
1. 250 Cal. App.2d at 198, 58 Cal.
Rptr. at 526.

2. 250 Cal. App.2d at 200, 58 Cal.
Rptr. at 527.
3. 250 Cal. App.2d at 201, 58 Cal.
Rp:r. at 528.
4. 245 Cal. App.2d 820, 54 Cal. Rptr.
177 (1966), afJ'd mem., 388 U.S. 456,
18 L.Ed.2d 1317, 87 S.Ct. 2109 (1967);
the dicta implying that "pandering" is a
part of the offense proscribed by Penal
Code § 311.2 was specifically overruled
in People v. Noroff, 67 Cal.2d - , 63
Cal. Rptr. 575, 433 P.2d 479 (1967).
The court in NorofJ stated that Penal
Code § 311.2 does not apply to matters
346
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produced solely for the personal enjoyment of the creator or as a means for
the improvement of his artistic technique. But the discussion above on the
standard of obscenity still seems applicable.
5. Section 311(a) of the California
Penal Code reads as follows:
"Obscene" means that to the average
person, applying contemporary standards, the predominant appeal of the
matter, taken as a whole, is to prurient interest, i.e., a shameful or morbid interest in nudity, sex, or excretion, which goes substantially beyond
customary limits of candor in description or representation of such matters
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lower court's ruling that since a film was obscene within the
statutory definition, any showing of it would be in violation
of the Penal Code.
The statutory definition had been amended in 1961 to
conform to the United States Supreme Court's mandate in
Roth v. United States. 6 The test of obscenity laid down in
Roth is "whether to the average person, applying contemporary community standards, the dominant theme of the material taken as a whole appeals to prurient interest."7 A comparison of the Roth test with the definition contained in the
Penal Code indicates that they are not identical. Even assuming, however, that the Penal Code definition does meet the
Roth test, three Justices of the United States Supreme Court
have, since Roth, restated the test in more specific terms. In
A Book Named "John Cleland's Memoirs of a Woman of
Pleasure" v. Attorney General of Massachusetts,S the test was
restated to include the establishment of three standards that
must all be met:
(a) the dominant theme of the material taken as a
whole [must appeal] to a prurient interest in sex; (b)
the material [must be] patently offensive because it
affronts contemporary community standards relating to
the description or representation of sexual matters; and
(c) the material [must be] utterly without redeeming
social value. 9
Comparing this test with the Roth test, significant change
is evident. lO The Roth test requires only that the material
have a dominant theme that appeals to prurient interests
when viewed in the context of contemporary community standards. Neither the criterion of "patently offensive" nor of
and is matter which is utterly without
redeeming social importance.
6. 354 U.S. 476, 1 L.Ed.2d 1498, 77
S.Ct. 1304 (1957).
7. 354 U.S. at 489, 1 L.Ed.2d at
1509, 77 S.Ct. at 1311.
8. 383 U.S. 413, 16 L.Ed.2d 1, 86
S.Ct. 975 (1966).

9. 383 U.S. at 418, 16 L.Ed.2d at 6,
86 S.Ct. at 977.
10. It must be pointed out, however,
that only three Justices-Warren, Brennan, and Fortas-joined in the Memoirs
opinion.

CAL LAW 1967
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"utterly without redeeming social value," as required by
Memoirs, enters into the Roth test. l l Regardless of the background on which the Memoirs test is founded, there are three
parts to the test, and material alleged to be obscene must
be measured against all three parts.
Returning to the Landau case, it is apparent that while
Justice Taylor refers to the Memoirs case, he does not apply
the three-part test, but applies the Roth test as codified in the
Penal Code. Justice Taylor then tests the film against the
"social importance" provision in the statute and concludes:
"[I]n our opinion, the production does nothing more than
depict a number of disjointed scenes treating sex in a shocking, morbid and shameful manner and is devoid of artistic
merit.»l2 To bolster its conclusion that the film was objectionable, the court used the approach approved in Ginzburg
v. United States,13 and found that the film had been commercially exploited, with substantial sums of money being earned
by its showing.
The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari in the
Landau case and, in a per curiam decision, affirmed the decision of the California appellate court. Although Justices
Warren, Brennan, Clark, Harlan, and White voted to affirm,
Justices Black, Douglas, Stewart, and Fortas would have
reversed. While one can only speculate as to why the Justices
voted as they did in affirming the Landau case, one does wonder about the positions of Justices Warren and Brennan. The
appellate court did not apply the three-part test that was
approved by Justices Warren, Brennan, and Fortas in
Memoirs. Completely absent from the Penal Code and from
Justice Taylor's opinion is any reference to part (b) of the
Memoirs test, that is, whether the material was "patently
offensive." Justice Fortas voted to reverse the Landau case,
11. Even in Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378
U.S. 184, 12 L.Ed.2d 793, 84 S.Ct.
1676 (1964), although Justice Brennan
stated that "obscenity is excluded from
the constitutional protection only because it is 'utterly without redeeming
social value,''' he does not explicitly
348
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amend the Roth test. No indication is
given where the "patently offensive"
part of the test arose.
12. 245 Cal. App.2d at 829, 54 Cal.
Rptr. at 183.
13. 383 U.S. 463, 16 L.Ed.2d 31, 86
S.Ct. 942 (1966).
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and it may be that he concluded that neither the Penal Code
nor Justice Taylor's opinion correctly states the Memoirs test.
FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT-DUE PROCESS-Generally

One of the basic tenets of constitutional law is:
[T]he courts will not nullify laws enacted under the police
power unless they are manifestly unreasonable, arbitrary
or capricious, having no real or substantial relation to the
public health, safety, morals or general welfare. 14
On several occasions this past year, claims of manifest unreasonableness were rejected by the California courts. The
courts found valid as against this attack a charge by a city
of 2 cents per ton for each ton hauled by trucks weighing
27,000 pounds or over;15 price maintenance provisions of the
Alcoholic Beverage Control Act;16 and the prohibition against
physicians and surgeons having any proprietary interest in a
pharmacy.17 The basic position taken was that it was for
the legislature to make such decisions, even though it might
be debatable whether a statute really satisfies a public need.
The Supreme Court of California dealt also with several
other specific due process problems. In People v. United
National Insurance Co./ 8 it upheld state regulation of the
insurance transactions of foreign insurance companies having
no agents or offices in California, but doing business in California with California residents exclusively by mail. The
14. Ratkovich v. City of San Bruno,
245 Cal. App.2d at 879, 54 Cal. Rptr.
at 338-339. See also Ferguson v.
Skrupa, 372 U.S. 726, 10 L.Ed.2d 93,
83 S.Ct. 1028, 95 A.L.R.2d 1347 (1963);
Olsen v. Nebraska, 313 U.S. 236, 85
L.Ed. 1305, 61 S.Ct. 862, 133 A.L.R.
1500 (1941).
15. Ratkovich v. City of San Bruno,
245 Cal. App.2d 870, 54 Cal. Rptr. 333
(1966). See discussion in McKinstry,
STATE AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT, in this
volume.
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16. 36 Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code
24749-24757; Wilke & Holzheiser,
Inc. v. Dept. of Alcoholic Bev. Control,
65 Cal.2d 349, 55 Cal. Rptr. 23, 420
P.2d 735 (1966).
17. Magan Med. Clinic v. Cal. St. Bd.
of Med. Examiners, 249 Cal. App.2d
124, 57 Cal. Rptr. 256 (1967). See
Brandel, BUSINESS ASSOCIATIONS, in this
volume.
18. 66 Cal.2d 577, 58 Cal. Rptr. 599,
427 P.2d 199 (1967), appeal dismissed,
- U.S. - , 19 L.Ed.2d 562, 88 S.Ct.
506 (1967).
CAL L.AW 1967
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Insurance Commissioner sought to enjoin three foreign insurance companies from carrying on their mail order business
until they complied with section 700 of the Insurance Code
and obtained a certificate of authority. Two of the companies
mailed application forms to prospective purchasers. When
these forms were completed and returned to the companies,
policies were issued at the home offices and sent to the applicants. The third company sent a pre-endorsed policy to the
California resident, together with an application. When the
applicant returned the application and the first premium, the
policy became effective.
The court recognized that, in the McCarran Act,19 Congress
had conferred on the states the authority to regulate and
tax the business of insurance, even though the United States
Supreme Court had earlier held that such business was interstate commerce. But since state regulation is nevertheless subject to due process, the court had to look to pre-McCarran
decisions for guidelines of due process in this type of case.
It isolated two separate yet consistent trends of decision. The
first is exemplified by a trilogy of cases 20 that emphasized the
place of making a contract sought to be taxed or regulated,
and held that if the activities relevant to the making and
carrying out of such a contract occurred outside the taxing
or regulating state, an attempt to tax or regulate it would
be in violation of due process. The second trend is exemplified
by two later cases that laid emphasis on the contacts1 with
the regulating state arising from the transactions involved
and the interest of the state in these transactions. The latter
trend indicates that if a state has sufficient interests and
contacts, regulation of the transactions does not violate due
process.
19. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1011-1015.
20. Conn. Gen. Life Ins. Co. v. Johnson, 303 U.S. 77, 82 L.Ed. 673, 58 S.Ct.
436 (1938); St. Louis Cotton Compress
Co. v. Arkansas, 260 U.S. 346, 67 L.Ed.
297, 43 S.Ct. 125 (1922); Allgeyer v.
Louisiana, 165 U.S. 578, 41 L.Ed. 832,
17 S.Ct. 427 (1897).
3.$0
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1. See Hoopeston Canning Co. v.
Cullin, 318 U.S. at 319,87 L.Ed. at 783,
63 S.Ct. at 606, 145 A.L.R. at 1119
(1943); Osborn v. OzIin, 310 U.S. 53,
84 L.Ed. 1074, 60 S.Ct. 758 (1940).
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In United National the court used the reasoning of the
second trend and held that the interests of, and the contacts
with, the state arising from a mail order business were sufficient to give California a substantial interest in the transactions. The transactions, therefore, do not violate the due
process mandate of the Fourteenth Amendment. Further, the
decision is in accord with a recent Wisconsin case,2 which
was also dismissed on appeal to the United States Supreme
Court for want of a substantial federal question.
This writer submits that the decision of the California
court is not even in conflict with the United States Supreme
Court decisions representing the first trend, since these cases
dealt with either the state's power to tax or the imposition
of criminal sanctions, and not with the state's power to
regulate. The power to regulate falls within the police power
of the state and should not depend on a technical determination of where a contract is made, but rather on the sum
total of the facts leading up to the eventual placing of the
insurance in force. 3
The due process issue was again raised in In re Halko.4
In a proceeding for a writ of habeas corpus, the court upheld
the right of the state to quarantine a person with a contagious
and infectious disease for an indefinite period, provided that
there is reasonable cause to suspect that a threat to public
health and safety exists.
The petitioner had been found to have active pulmonary
tuberculosis and had been confined to a hospital after being
served with a quarantine order of isolation. Petitioner deserted the hospital and was later convicted of violating section
3351 of the Health and Safety Code. While in jail, petitioner
was again served with an order of isolation because of his
tuberculosis, and was returned to the hospital. By successive
isolation orders, served at 6-month intervals, the petitioner
was confined to the hospital for approximately 18 months.
2. Ministers Life & Cas. Union v.
Haase, 30 Wis.2d 339, 141 N.W.2d 287
(1966), appeal dismissed, 385 U.S. 205,
17 L.Ed.2d 301, 87 S.Ct. 407 (1966).
3. See Hoopeston Canning Co. v.
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Cullin, 318 U.S. at 319, 87 L.Ed. at
783, 63 S. Ct. at 606, 145 A.L.R. at
1119 (1943).
4. 246 Cal. App.2d 553, 54 Cal Rptr.
661 (1966).
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Halko contended that these consecutive orders of quarantine
and isolation, issued "without means of questioning and judicially determining" the conclusion of the health officer, resulted in "continually depriving one of his liberty," and that
therefore, section 3285 "is unconstitutional in that it deprives
this petitioner of his liberty without due process of law."5
The court sustained the right of the state under its police
power to protect the health and safety of its citizens. The
court pointed out that the legislature is given broad discretion
in determining what measures are necessary for the protection
of such interests, the determination of which diseases are
infectious and contagious, and the adoption of appropriate
measures for preventing their spread. 6
While this decision follows prevailing law,7 the petitioner
did raise the due process question, whether the discretionary
decision of the health officer should not at some time be subject to judicial review. s Since it appears from the decision
that a person quarantined in California can secure such a
judicial review by using a writ of habeas corpus, the due process requirement is satisfied.
During the past year, the Court of Appeal added another
case to the growing list of cases that authorize summary suspension of licenses before the licensee is given a hearing.
In Stewart v. County of San Mateo/ the licensee had a permit
to operate a private patrol service within the county. This
permit was summarily revoked by the sheriff.lO In an action
for declaratory judgment that the ordinance under which his
permit had been revoked was invalid, the revocation was upheld. The general rule in California has been:
5. 246 Cal. App.2d at 554, 54 Cal.
Rptr. at 662.
6. 246 Cal. App.2d at 557, 54 Cal.
Rptr. at 663.
7. 25 AM JUR, Health (1st ed § 38
at 315).
8. See Note, Due Process for AllConstitutional Standards for Involuntary
Civil Commitment and Release, 34 U.
OF CHI. L. REV. 663 (1967).
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9. 246 Cal. App.2d 273, 54 Cal. Rptr.
599 (1966).
10. San Mateo City Ord. Code
5620.8 provides in part: "The sheriff
shall revoke any permit issued hereunder when in his opinion the permittee
is violating any of the provisions of this
chapter or of the Private Investigator
and Adjuster Act."
§
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[B]ecause of reasons of justice and policy, a statute,
unless it expressly provides to the contrary, will be interpreted to require a hearing in license revocation proceedings where it contemplates a quasi-judicial determination by the administrative agency that there be cause
for the revocation. l l
The California Supreme Court, however, has held that
due process is not violated by a summary suspension or revocation of a license where the action of the administrative
agency is then subject to judicial review. This summary procedure, when justified by a compelling public interest, is
consistent with the position of the United States Supreme
Court. 12 In Stewart, the court, recognizing that the right to
engage in legitimate employment is an individual freedom
secured by the due process clauses of the Federal and State
Constitutions, concluded that the public interest is served
by the summary procedure as long as the licensee may secure
a hearing by appeal to the board. It said, "We are persuaded
that because the role of a private patrol officer is akin to that
of peace officers, it bears a sensitive relationship to the public
interest."13 Although the court did not expressly say so, it
implied that the hearing accorded the licensee by the board
was one in which the licensee was allowed to present evidence
in opposition to the revocation of his license.
But if due process requires that a person be given a hearing
before some action can be taken against him, does it require
that the hearing must be before the agency that takes the
action? This unusual question arose in the case of O'Reilly
v. Board of Medical Examiners.14 The petitioner, O'Reilly,
was a licensed osteopath and therefore subject to control
by the Board of Osteopathic Examiners. Charges were filed
with the board against him, alleging that he had violated sec11. 246 Cal. App.2d at 283, 54 Cal.
Rptr. at 605.
12. Bourjois, Inc. v. Chapman, 301
U.S. 183, 81 L.Ed. 1027, 57 S.Ct. 691
(1937). See also Note, Automobiles:
Constitutionality of Safety Responsibility Laws, 39 CAL. L. REV. 123 (1951).
23
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13. 246 Cal. App.2d at 288, 54 Cal.
Rptr. at 608.
14. 66 CaI.2d 381, 58 Cal. Rptr. 7,
426 P.2d 167 (1967).
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tion 2392 of the Business and Professions Code. 15 An appointed hearing officer, after holding a hearing in accordance
with the statutory requirements/a recommended disciplinary
action against the petitioner. In the interim, the petitioner
elected to be licensed by the Board of Medical Examiners,
and he was granted a physician's and surgeon's certificate.
Shortly thereafter, the Board of Medical Examiners ratified
the proceedings that had taken place before the Board of
Osteopathic Examiners and adopted the decision of the hearing officer. No additional hearing had been given to the
petitioner. The lower court and the Supreme Court affirmed
the decision of the Board of Medical Examiners, and held
that there had been no violation of due process in this procedure. As a basis for its decision, the Supreme Court stated,
"due process is not interested in mere technical formalism.
It is the substance that is determinative of whether due process
has been afforded. "17
The fact that neither the Board of Osteopathic Examiners
nor the Board of Medical Examiners heard the evidence was
not fataI,18 The board that decides the matter, however,
must itself consider the evidence presented to the hearing officer. As long as the board makes the final decision after an
independent review of the record, it is not precluded from
adopting the hearing officer's recommendation. Thus it would
appear that the California Supreme Court's answer in the
O'Reilly case is correct.
Right v. Privilege-Attendance at State Institutions of Higher
Learning

In Goldberg v. Regents of the University of California/ 9
the question whether an interest is a right or privilege was
15. This section prohibits the employment of an unlicensed practitioner in
the practice of any system or mode of
treating the sick or afflicted.
16. Cal. Gov't. Code, §§ 11503,
11505 and 11509.
17. 66 Cal.2d at 384, 58 Cal. Rptr.
at 9, 428 P.2d at 606.
354
CAL LAW 1967

http://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/callaw/vol1967/iss1/15

18. See Morgan v. United States, 298
U.S. 468, 80 L.Ed. 1288, 56 S.Ct. 906
(1936); Cooper v. State Ed. of Med.
Examiners, 35 Cal.2d 242, 217 P.2d
630, 18 A.L.R.2d 593 (1950).

19. 248 Cal. App.2d 867, 57 Cal.
Rptr. 463 (1967).
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held not to be determinative of whether a hearing is necessary before an interest can be restricted. This approach more
accurately reflects the true spirit of due process than the
classification of interests as privileges or rights. Due process
is concerned with justice and fair play, which require that
when the government seeks to revoke or restrict an interest
of an individual, the individual should have an opportunity to
be heard before the action becomes final. There may be
times when the interest of the public requires that the action
be taken first, but as indicated in the cases reviewed above,
where the action depends upon factual determinations, the
individual should be allowed to participate in the ultimate
determination of those facts.

FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT-DUE PROCESS-Taxation: "In Flight" Time Is Taxable
A due process question of first impression in California,
and one involving an area in which the United States Supreme
Court has not yet spoken, was dealt with in Zan top Air
Transport v. County of San Bernardino. 20 The question
concerned the use of "in flight" time in an apportionment
formula used to levy an ad valorem property tax on the plaintiff's flight equipment.
The plaintiff was an airline company based in Detroit,
Michigan, but operating aircraft in and out of and within
California. The county tax assessor had devised a formula
to tax the flight equipment, which included not only the
ground time in the county but also time "in flight" within
California, when the planes were coming into and leaving the
state. The assessor had also used one-half of the "in flight"
time for flights between bases within the state. The plaintiffs
conceded that under Braniff Airways, Inc. v. Nebraska State
Board of Equalization, l their aircraft were subject to an ad
20. 246 Cal. App.2d 433, 54 Cal.
Rptr. 813 (1966).
1. 347 U.S. 590, 98 L.Ed. 967, 74
S.Ct. 757 (1954). Braniff's home base
was in Minnesota. It had 18 scheduled
stops in Nebraska, all of short dura-
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services as business required, but had
no storage or repair facilities. A Nebraska statute imposed an ad valorem
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all regularly scheduled planes, apporCAL LAW 1967
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valorem property tax on a properly apportioned basis. However, neither Braniff nor any other United States Supreme
Court or California appellate court case had considered "in
flight" time in an apportionment formula.
There should be no constitutional defect in the allocation
formula used in the instant case. The three factors that have
influenced the United States Supreme Court in taxation apportionment cases have been: (1) whether the property has acquired a taxable situs elsewhere;2 (2) whether the tax in
practical operation has relation to opportunities, benefits, or
protection conferred or afforded by the state; and (3) whether
the tax constitutes an unreasonable burden on interstate
commerce. s
These tests were met in the Zan top case. No other state
could tax the "in flight" time in California, and the airline
did enjoy benefits and protections from the county, not only
while on the ground but during flight over the land subject
to the jurisdiction of the taxing authority. Further, the tax
did not appear to be an unreasonable burden on interstate
commerce.

FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT-EQUAL PROTEC·
TION-Apportionment: Irrigation Districts Do Not
Govern
The equal protection clause also received its share of attention this year. Such diverse problems as reapportionment,
taxation, and liability for the care of mental patients came
under scrutiny.
tioned by a formula having three ratios:
(1) ratio of arrivals and departures to
that of the previous year; (2) ratio of
revenue tons handled at state airports
to that of all airports; and (3) ratio
of revenue collected within the state to
total revenue for the same period. The
Supreme Court held that the situs issue
devolves into whether 18 stops per day
is sufficient contact with Nebraska to
sustain that state's power to levy an apportioned ad valorem tax, and said that
the basis of jurisdiction is the habitual
356
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employment of the property within the
state. Nebraska affords protection during such stops, and these regular landings were clearly a benefit to appellant.
The court, therefore, held that Nebraska
had sufficient contact to impose the tax.

2. See Northwest Airlines v. Minnesota, 322 U.S. 292, 88 L.Ed. 1283, 64
S.Ct. 950, 153 A.L.R. 245 (1944).
3. See Ott v. Mississippi Valley Barge
Line Co., 336 U.S. 169, 93 L.Ed. 585,
69 S.Ct. 432 (1949).
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The California Court of Appeal for the Fifth District, in
Thompson v. Board of Directors,4 had to plow new ground
to reach a decision on the question of the reapportionment
of an irrigation district. The district is governed by a board
consisting of five members, and is divided into five divisions;
one director is elected from each division. These divisions
had not been modified for over 30 years.
The respondents had unsuccessfully petitioned the appellant Board of Directors to redraw the division lines so that
there would be less disparity in the distribution of the population among the five divisions. They then petitioned the
Superior Court of Stanislaus County to do so. The trial judge
granted judgment for respondents and issued a writ of mandate directing the redrawing of boundary lines. The irrigation district appealed from this order. Although the California Supreme Court required the reapportionment of county
supervisorial districts5 2 years ago, it has not yet spoken on
the question of apportionment of special districts such as the
one involved in this case. Nor could the Court of Appeal
find help from the United States Supreme Court, where the
apportionment cases have all been concerned with either state
legislative or congressional reapportionment. 6
Operating in this vacuum, the court devised a test of its
own:
[1]f the principal purpose of a district is to provide a
service or services which can be and are sometimes provided by a private or quasi-public corporation (such as
a public utility company), and if in the accomplishment
of this purpose it does not exercise general powers of
government, it is not subject to the "one man, one vote"
4. 247 Cal. App.2d 587, 55 Cal. Rptr.
689 (1967).
5. Wiltse v. Board of Supervisors, 65
Cal.2d 314, 54 Cal. Rptr. 320, 419 P.2d
440 (1966); Miller v. Board of Supervisors, 63 Cal.2d 343, 46 Cal. Rptr.
617, 405 P.2d 857 (1965).
6. The cases of Sailors v. Board of
Ed., 387 U.S. 105, 18 L.Ed.2d 650, 87

S.Ct. 1549 (1967), involving a county
school board, and Dusch v. Davis, 387
U.S. 112, 18 L.Ed.2d 656, 87 S.Ct.
1554 (1967), involving an election of
city councilmen, did not require the
United States Supreme Court to state
whether the "one man, one vote" doctrine extended below the legislative
level.
CAL LAW 1967
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rule. If, however, its principal purpose is to govern or
if its functions are primarily governmental in nature, or
if not governmental in nature they are accomplished
by the exercise of general powers of government, it meets
the test, and the doctrine is applicable. 7
Applying this test to an irrigation district, the court concluded
that the district fell within the first part of the test and therefore was not subject to the "one man, one vote" requirement. 8
While it can be suggested that since irrigation districts
are creatures of the legislature, they should properly be apportioned, it appears that the test devised by the Court of Appeal
is a reasonable one. The test is somewhat broader than a
mere search for an answer to the question whether the body
is performing a legislative function. Although the court does
not give explicit guidelines for determining whether a ~ody's
"principal purpose is to govern," it is possible that some special bodies, which do not have legislative powers, may be said
to perform other governmental functions. Thus the courts
that adopt this test will have to decide whether to reapportion
a body that assesses, levies, or collects taxes; grants a franchise; or provides such services as fire protection, police protection, or maintenance of park and recreational areas.

EQUAL PROTECTION-Taxation
The Estate of Rogers9 raised an interesting equal protection
problem in a taxation case. The taxpayer was required to
pay an inheritance tax on one-half the value of joint tenancy
property, the purchase price of which came from quasicommunity property. The husband and wife had come to
California from Ohio in 1955, bringing with them certain
7. 247 Cal. App.2d at 592, 55 Cal.
Rptr. at 692.
8. Although the population criterion
was not unconstitutional, the board's
abuse of discretion justified the trial
court's action requiring it to change
boundaries. See also McKinstry, STATE
AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT, in this volume.
358
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9. 245 Cal. App.2d 101, 53 Cal. Rptr.
572 (1966). Although this decision is
dated Sept. 21, 1966, it has been ineluded in the survey because the decision was modified on Oct. 13, 1966,
before it became final. See Estate of
Rogers, 53 Cal. Rptr. 572 (1966) for
modification.
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funds that represented the husband's earnings prior to their
move. These funds, although conceded to be the husband's
separate property, became quasi-community property after
the couple settled in this state. The husband used the funds
to purchase various parcels of real estate, taking the title in
joint tenancy with his wife. She had not furnished any part
of the consideration for these purchases. The wife died in
1964, and the husband petitioned the superior court to establish the fact of the wife's death and to determine whether
any inheritance tax was payable.
The superior court found that section 13672 of the Revenue
and Taxation Code, which controlled this factual situation,
violated the equal protection clauses of the California and
the United States Constitutions. The Court of Appeal disagreed. Section 13672 states in essence that where joint
tenancy property is purchased from quasi-community property
funds, one-half the value of the property shall be taxed
in the estate of the first joint tenant to die, as if that joint
tenant had contributed one-half of the consideration for the
purchase thereof.
This in itself raised no constitutional question, but such a
question is raised when one considers that section 13671 of
the same code, which relates to joint tenancies generally,
allows the surviving joint tenant to prove that the deceased
did not contribute any part of the consideration for the
acquisition of the joint tenancy.l0 When he does so, no tax
is levied. Further, under section 13671.5, [i]f a husband and
wife place community property in their joint names, the joint
tenancy shall be treated as if it were community property.ll
As community property, the interest of the deceased joint
tenant spouse is not subject to being taxed. 12
In reaching its decision in Rogers, the appellate court
seemed to place emphasis on the fact that the legislature
"attempted, in certain areas, to assimilate the rights of the
nonacquiring spouse in property acquired during a marriage
10. 245 Cal. App.2d at 104, 53 Cal.
Rptr. at 574.
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11. 245 Cal. App.2d at 104, 53 Cal.
Rptr. at 574.
12. Cal. Rev. & Tax. Code § 13551.
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elsewhere to the rights of California domiciliaries."13 The
court reasoned that because the legislature had tried to give
quasi-community property owners the same benefits as community owners, the taxpayer here should not complain because
he has not received any such benefits from this legislation.
However, the court overlooked the fact that what had been
taxed was an interest in joint tenancy property that passed
from the deceased to the survivor, and, no matter what the
source of the funds, the survivor received that interest from
the decedent by operation of law. The interest that passed
to the survivor is the same interest, whether the funds were
from separate property, community property, or quasi-community property. The legislature has exempted from taxation
that interest in two of these three situations, as pointed out
above. Section 13672, therefore, is construed to treat this
surviving joint tenant differently from the other surviving
joint tenants, yet there is no showing of any rational basis
for this different treatment.
In another taxation case, Willingham Bus Lines, Inc. v.
Municipal Court,l4 a charter bus company found no relief
from the Supreme Court. At issue was a tax that is levied
by the City of San Diego on the business of furnishing charter
buses for hire. The tax was based on the gross receipts
received by the bus operator, adjusted to the mileage the
buses run in the city. Taxicabs, sightseeing buses, autos for
hire, all paid a flat license fee, as did charter boats, sightseeing boats, and charter airplanes.
The taxpayer had contended that this classification violated
the equal protection clause, and the Court of Appeal agreed.
That court stated:
We are unable to draw a distinction with relevant difference between appellant and the other closely related
passenger-carrying businesses enumerated in the ordinance and taxed on a different basis.15
13. 245 Cal. App.2d at 109, 53 Cal.
Rptr. at 577.
14. 66 Cal.2d 893, 59 Cal. Rptr. 618,
428 P.2d 602 (1967).
360
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15. 248 A.C.A. I, 5, 56 Cal. Rptr.
at 94 (1967).
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This argument did not impress the Supreme Court, however,
and because the plaintiff could not show that "these disparate
formulae for taxation work a concrete hardship upon charter
bus lines,»lS it had to pay the tax under the city's formulae,
although others similarly situated paid only a flat license fee.
In Web Service Co. v. Spencer,17 another taxpayer also
alleged discriminatory treatment and lost. The taxpayer
owned a number of coin-operated washing machines and
driers, which he had located in motels, apartment houses, and
trailer courts. On December 31, 1963, he owned 693
machines at 261 locations. Under the Anaheim Municipal
Code, the business of coin-operated machines, such as that
owned by the taxpayer, was subject to a tax of $1 per
machine annually. However, the person conducting such a
business had the option to pay the tax based on his gross
receipts, which were taxed on a prescribed graduated scale,
with a minimum of $25 for each separate location.
The city contended that the taxpayer was operating at 261
different locations, and therefore he would be required to pay
the minimum tax of $25 for each location if he chose to
use the alternate, gross receipts method of paying the tax.
The taxpayer brought a writ of mandamus to require the issuance of one license to cover all of his machines. He argued
that even though he had machines at a number of locations,
he should be treated no differently than a laundromat operator
who has as many as 30 machines at one location. The
laundromat operator, by being faced with only a minimum
tax of $25 for his location, even though having 30 or more
machines there, was in a position to compare the gross receipts
tax and the per machine tax, and take his choice. The taxpayer in this case had no such choice available, because of
the city's insistence that he pay the minimum tax of $25 for
each location.
The superior court agreed with the taxpayer that the interpretation of the ordinance by the city discriminated against
him and therefore violated the equal protection clause. The
16. 66 Cal.2d at 897, 59 Cal. Rptr.
at 621, 428 P.2d at 604.

17. 252 Cal. App.2d 891, 61 Cal.
Rptr. 493 (1967).
CAL LAW 1967
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Court of Appeal found otherwise. It pointed out that while
the result will place in one classification a route operator such
as the taxpayer in this case, and a laundromat operator in
another, there does appear to be a reasonable basis for such
classification. The court noted that the city council may
have been aware that the operations of route operators and
laundromat operators differ, and that the gross receipts computation alone would not afford a basis on which to equate
the tax burden between the two types of operations. The
court concluded by holding that the ordinance
meet[s] the requirement that the classification or measure of tax used shall be reasonably related to the objective of the legislation, viz., the taxable event; do[es] not
unlawfully discriminate against the route operator; do[es]
not impose a tax in an amount that is confiscatory or as
a subterfuge to eliminate competition . . .18
Thus it appears that the court did test the tax and its application to the taxpayer against a measurable standard in finding
that there was no violation of the equal protection clause.
Equal protection has no meaning unless there are some standards beyond which the legislature cannot go. While equal
protection standards may be vague and uncertain, and subject to different application by different individuals, there
nevertheless ought to be some standards, and the courts ought
to apply them in each case. This was done by the Court of
Appeal in Web Service, but not by the Supreme Court in
Willingham.
FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT-EQUAL PROTECTION
-Care for Patients in State Mental Institutions
One final equal protection problem, the determination of
the obligation of the estate of a deceased husband to pay for
care of a wife who had previously been committed to a state
mental institution, was presented to two courts of appeal.
Both reached identical results. The obligation was upheld
18. 252 Cal. App.2d at 902-903, 61
Cal. Rptr. at 501.
362

http://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/callaw/vol1967/iss1/15

19. 246 Cal. App.2d 24, 54 Cal Rptr.
432 (1966).
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in Department of Mental Hygiene v. O'Connor19 and in Department of Mental Hygiene v. Kolts. 20
Prior to 1967, section 6650 of the Welfare and Institutions
Code defined those persons obligated to pay for such care.
It read, in part, as follows:
The husband, wife, father, mother, or children of a
., and the administrators of
mentally ill person.
their estates,
. shall be liable for his care, support, and maintenance in a state institution of which he
is an inmate. The liability of such persons and estates
shall be a joint and several liability. . . .1
It was the contention of the representatives of the estates
of the husbands in both cases that a prior case, Department
of Mental Hygiene v. Kirchner/ had held section 6650 to be
unconstitutional, and that thereby no liability existed. In
Kirchner, the Supreme Court of California held that it was
a denial of equal protection under the California Constitution3 to charge an adult child, under section 6650, with
the cost of his parent's care while the parent was a patient
in a state mental hospital. It was a denial of equal protection
to select one particluar class of persons for a species of
taxation with no rational basis to such classification.
In both O'Connor and Kolts, the appellate courts concluded that Kirchner did not hold section 6650 to be unconstitutional per se, but only that classification that made the
adult child liable for the parent's care. On this basis, then,
the courts were able to discuss the liability of the husband
under the statute. Both courts found the liability of the husband to stand on a different footing than the liability of the
adult child.
20. 247 Cal. App.2d 154, 55 Cal.
Rptr. 437 (1966).
1. § 6650 was repealed, Stats. 1967,
c. 1667, § 36.5, p. - , and replaced by
§ 7275 of the same code. Stats. 1967,
c. 1667, § 40, p. - . The pertinent part
of § 7275 is substantially the same as
§ 6650.

2. 60 Ca1.2d 716, 36 Cal. Rptr. 488,
388 P.2d 720 (1964), vacated, 380 U.S.
194, 13 L.Ed.2d 753, 85 S.Ct. 871
(1964); reiterated on remand 62 Cal.2d
586, 43 Cal. Rptr. 329, 400 P.2d 321
(1965).
3. Cal. Const., Art. I, §§ 11 and 21.
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The court in O'Connor reached its decision by stating that
although a husband has a legal obligation to support his wife,
evidenced by history and statutes, there is no common-law
basis to impose liability on a child to support his parent.
The Kolts court took the same position, and traced the common-law liability of the husband to support the wife. While
these cases do not raise or settle any unusual constitutional
issues, they are worthy of note, for they limit Kirchner to
factual situations wherein the person sought to be found
responsible has no common-law or other statutory obligation
to support the patient to whom the care is given.
CONCLUSION
In assessing the appellate courts' handling of these various
questions, it is apparent that the constitutional rights of public
employees were carefully preserved.
Obscenity again underwent judicial scrutiny, but it appears that until the United States Supreme Court can agree
upon a test for obscenity, other courts and legislatures will
have to do the best they can with the standards previously
enunciated.
In the cases involving due process clauses, while some of
the questions were novel, it appears that the appellate courts
gave the matters fair consideration. Their decisions were
consistent with the basic tenet that government action, when
tested against the due process clause, must not be unreasonable or arbitrary, and must be reasonably related to the objective sought to be accomplished by the action.
By adopting its own test of whether the "one man, one
vote" rule ought to apply to local government units, the
Court of Appeal for the Fifth District steered a middle course
between those who argue that all elected government units
should be apportioned, and those who say that the rule should
apply only to those units exercising legislative powers.
When the court determines that a tax does not violate
the equal protection clause, it should reach that conclusion
by measuring the legislative classification againt a definite
standard. To merely say that there need not be absolute
3~4
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equality, as the Supreme Court did in Willingham, is not a
sufficient answer to such a constitutional issue. In Willingham the court upheld the tax without discussing why the
tax was not a discriminatory classification, whereas in Web
Service the appellate court, even though upholding the tax,
did apply a standard and made a case for the classification.
A reasonable classification was also found in the cases that
raised the issue of statutory liability for care of a patient at
a state mental institution. Here again, the classification was
tested and found constitutionally acceptable .
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